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A common critique of most measures of income inequality, which are based on a 
single year's income, is that they fail to take account of income mobility. If income 
fluctuations are large, and individuals can smooth consumption, then high inequality 
and high mobility may be no worse than low inequality and low mobility. To test this, 
I use panel data from four countries – Australia, Britain, Germany and the United 
States – and estimate measures of permanent income inequality that are based on 
income averaged over multiple years. I find that: (1) using pre-government income, 
annual inequality and permanent inequality have grown in Germany and the US, 
while post-government income inequality has grown in the US; (2) comparing levels 
of annual post-government income inequality across countries, the ranking was the 
US, Australia, Britain, Germany; (3) comparing levels of permanent income 
inequality across countries, the ranking of triennial post-government inequality in the 
most recent year was the US, Australia, Germany, Britain; (4) in the most recent year, 
the most mobile country was Australia, while the least mobile was Germany. 
However, as a comparison of points (2) and (3) demonstrates, mobility had little effect 
on the overall rankings.  
 
JEL Codes: D31, H23, N30, J62 
Keywords: permanent income, income distribution, Australia, Britain, Germany, 
United States   1
1. Introduction 
 
Empirical research on the distribution of resources has tended to focus almost exclusively 
on inequality of annual income. While this has the virtue of simplicity, rarely is any 
theoretical justification given for the choice of one year as the period over which income 
is to be recorded – rather than, for example, one month, or three years.  
 
In part, these gaps have been filled by two parallel literatures: one on income mobility, 
and another on wealth inequality. However, if we believe that what matters is average 
income over several years, then it may be useful to directly observe patterns of permanent 
income inequality across countries and over time. 
 
The focus of this paper is on patterns of permanent income inequality in four developed 
countries: Australia, Britain, Germany and the United States. Using comparable panel 
datasets from these four countries, I estimate measures of “permanent income inequality” 
– defined as average income over a two to ten year period – using two income 
definitions, pre-government income and post-government income.  
 
To preview my findings, I find that annual inequality and permanent inequality have 
grown in Germany and the US during the 1980s and 1990s, while post-government 
income inequality has grown in the US. In Britain, both measures remained fairly flat 
over the 1990s. Using data from the most recent available year, a comparison can be 
made of inequality across these four nations. On a standard one-year measure of post-
government inequality, the countries are ranked (from most to least unequal): the US, 
Australia, Britain, Germany.  Mobility does differ between the countries, with the 
countries ranked (from least mobile to most mobile): Germany, Britain, the US, 
Australia. However, differences in mobility have only a modest effect on the annual 
inequality rankings. Comparing three-year post-government inequality, the ranking is 
(from most to least unequal): the US, Australia, Germany, Britain.  
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 argues that permanent 
income inequality can make a useful addition to our conception of income inequality. 
Section 3 outlines the key features of the data series used in this analysis, and the 
methodology. Section 4 presents the results, and the final section concludes. 
 
2. Why permanent income inequality?  
 
Choosing the right inequality concept depends crucially on the question that the 
researcher sets out to answer. Five types of inequality are:  
 
1.  Individual-level consumption or expenditure inequality (typically averaged over a 
week or month) 
2.  Individual-level earnings inequality (often based on hourly wages, weekly 
earnings, or monthly earnings) 
3.  Annual inequality among households  
4.  Permanent income inequality (average income over a two to ten year period) 
among households  
5.  Wealth inequality among households 
 
Each of these inequality concepts has its particular advantages. If we want to know about 
the immediate material circumstances of the rich and poor, consumption inequality 
matters most. If we are interested in the effects of labor market reforms, earnings 
inequality is a natural place to begin. For a study of tax reforms in a country where 
returns are filed once a year, annual inequality is most relevant. With well-functioning 
credit markets, permanent income inequality provides a benchmark for the enduring gaps 
between rich and poor. And wealth inequality is the natural concept to turn to in any 
consideration of policies that affect bequests.  
 
Outside these examples, however, there are many other issues upon which the “right” 
measure of inequality is less evident. Some instances in which the optimal measure of 
inequality is likely to be permanent income inequality are:   3
  Savings and inequality: Since savings rates typically depend on permanent 
income, it is the distribution of permanent income that should have the greatest 
impact on savings behavior (for a survey of the literature on savings and 
inequality, see Thorbecke and Charumilind 2002). 
  Educational inequality: If children face limits to borrowing for college, those 
from families with higher levels of permanent income will be more likely to 
attend university (see Jencks 2002). 
  Health and inequality: Two of the channels through which inequality is said to 
affect health are relative deprivation and health expenditure. Both of these will be 
largely driven by inequality in permanent income. Other potential channels are 
more likely to be affected by different types of inequality (for a review of this 
literature, see Deaton 2003). 
  Happiness and inequality: Alesina, DiTella and MacCulloch (2001) point out 
that inequality should have a more negative impact on happiness in countries with 
low social mobility, all else equal. Implicit in this is that when considering the 
relationship between inequality and life satisfaction, permanent income inequality 
or wealth inequality will most probably be a better measure than inequality of 
annual incomes.  
  Politics and inequality: Keefer and Knack (2002) argue that inequality has a 
negative impact on the legal infrastructure, since it acts as a form of polarization. 
Polarization leads to divergent preferences in a community, and this causes both 
parties to underinvest in the legal system. Again, the form of inequality that is 
most likely to drive political preferences will be permanent income inequality or 
wealth inequality, rather than annual income inequality. 
 
More generally, Milanovic (2003) argues that the main reason that economists should 
care about inequality is because, for many individuals, the average income of those in 
their peer group enters (negatively) into their utility function. Over what period are 
individuals likely to observe the incomes of their peer group? While it is possible that 
year-to-year fluctuations in peer group incomes affect individual utility, it seems likely 
that permanent income or wealth matter most.   4
 
Several studies have compared permanent income inequality across developed countries. 
Burkhauser and Poupore (1997) estimate mobility and permanent income inequality 
measures for Germany and the United States in the period 1983-88, and conclude that the 
US has both higher inequality and lower mobility. Similarly, Aaberge et al (2002) use 
data from 1980-90, and find that Denmark, Norway and Sweden have lower levels of 
permanent income inequality than the US. The present paper is in a similar spirit to these 
papers, though it aims to compare permanent income inequality at more than one point in 
time.  
 
Three other literatures are related to this exercise: cross-country comparisons of 
individual earnings mobility (eg. Atkinson, Bourguignon and Morrison 1992; Fields 
2002; Daly and Valletta 2004; Fields et al 2005); cross-country comparisons of 
household income mobility rates (eg. Jarvis and Jenkins 1998; DiPrete 2001; Luttmer 
2002; Van Kerm 2004); and cross-country comparisons of income inequality (recent 
studies focusing on developed nations include Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997; Brandolini 
and Smeeding 2005; Förster and d’Ercole 2005; Smeeding 2005).  
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
The data used in this paper are drawn primarily from the Cross-National Equivalent Files 
(CNEF) compiled by researchers at Cornell University. The CNEF attempts to make 
comparable four panel surveys – the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), the British Household Panel Study (BHPS), 
and the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID).
1 For background on 
the CNEF, see Burkhauser et al (2001). The present study does not include data from the 
Canadian SLID, but it is hoped to incorporate Canada in a subsequent draft.
2 
                                                 
1 The German sample covers West Germany only from 1984-89, and was enlarged to also cover East 
Germany from 1990 onwards. 
2 Unlike Britain, Germany and the US, Canada does not supply researchers with the microdata from its 
panel survey. Instead, researchers must email a Stata do-file to Statistics Canada, where it is processed and 
the results returned by email. Due to unexpected staff turnover at Statistics Canada, the processing of my 
do-file has now been delayed for over six months.   5
 
I use two of the income variables from those files – pre-government income, and post-
government income. So far as possible, the researchers have attempted to make post-
government income comparable across the countries in the CNEF (see Burkhauser et al 
2004 for more details on post-government income). Precise definitions of the two income 
variables for each of the countries in this analysis are provided in the Data Appendix.  
 
For Australia, which is not yet part of the CNEF, I use the Household, Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey, a household-based panel study which 
began in 2001. In place of the pre-government and post-government income variables in 
CNEF, I use private income and disposable income in HILDA. For more details on these 
two variables, see Watson (2005). 
 
In estimating permanent income inequality, it is necessary to restrict the sample to 
contiguous years. Since the PSID shifted to biennial data collection after 1997, our US 
sample stops in that year. The sample period for the four surveys is 2001-03 for 
Australia; 1991-2002 for Britain; 1984-2003 for Germany; and 1980-1997 for the US. 
 
In estimating household income, it is necessary to make some adjustment for household 
size, an issue upon which there is little consensus in the literature (Nelson 1993; Creedy 
and Sleeman 2004). I apply a simple equivalence scale (used, among others, by the 
Luxembourg Income Study), in which total household income is divided by the square 
root of the number of household members. 
 
Permanent income is then calculated for each individual, by averaging their equivalized 
household income across two or more years. Changes in household income from year to 
year can arise from two factors: changes in the incomes of household members, or 
changes in household composition. If an individual moves from one household to 
another, then so long as they are successfully followed by the panel survey, this method 
will encapsulate the change in household income that results. 
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One point is worth noting about this methodology. Unlike Burkhauser and Poupore 
(1997), I do not restrict the sample to individuals with non-missing income in every year. 
While such an approach is appropriate to a comparison of two countries’ income mobility 
over the same time interval, the present approach allows comparison within countries 
over time, as well as between countries where the length of the panel survey differs. 
Survey weights are used in all analyses. 
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for household size and the two income measures used 
in the analysis. In all cases, the standard deviation of pre-government income is larger 
than the standard deviation of post-government income. In all cases, the gap between pre-
government income and post-government income is smaller than might be expected 
(indeed, in Britain, post-government income is actually higher than pre-government 
income). This is due to the fact that household incomes are divided by the square root of 
the number of household members, which means that an income transfer from a larger 
household to a smaller household raises the average size-equivalized household income. 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics    
 Mean  SD 
Australia 2001-2003 (N=20,103)    
Pre-government income (A$)  29375.04  33009.08 
Post-government income (A$)  25656.19  20965.81 
Household size (persons)  3.312  1.590 
Britain 1991-2002 (N=35,352)    
Pre-government income (£)  12261.38  11838.34 
Post-government income (£)  12450.8  7706.58 
Household size (persons)  2.768  1.344 
Germany 1984-2003 (N=52,263)    
Pre-government income (€)  17467.85  16695.02 
Post-government income (€)  15546.52  9610.55 
Household size (persons)  2.890  1.395 
United States 1980-97 (N=39,432)    
Pre-government income (US$)  21822.62  26997.15 
Post-government income (US$)  17772.11  17088.37 
Household size (persons)  3.241  1.567 
Note: Sample sizes are the number of persons whose pre-government income was recorded in at least one 
year of the survey. 
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4. Permanent income inequality in four countries 
 
To begin, I estimate annual income inequality using pre-government and post-
government income. For simplicity, all results that follow are shown for the gini 
coefficient. Tabulations by other inequality measures are available from the author upon 
request.  
 
Figure 1 shows the results for each of the countries in the sample. With the exception of 
Germany in the early-1980s, the gini for annual pre-government inequality in all these 
countries is between 0.4 and 0.45. For post-government annual income inequality, 
however, there are larger differences across countries: in Britain and Germany, the ginis 
are below 0.3, while in Australia and the United States they are above 0.3. So far as the 
trends are concerned, the Australian panel is too short to discern any trends. For Britain, 
annual pre-government inequality is essentially flat over this period, while annual post-
government inequality is mostly flat, with a slight uptick in the early-2000s. For 
Germany and the United States, annual inequality rose steadily through the 1980s and 
1990s, though in the case of Germany, post-government inequality rose less steeply. 



























































1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
United States
Solid line denotes pre-government income; Dashed line denotes post-government income




In Figures 2 and 3, I estimate permanent income inequality, as measured by the gini 
coefficient for two-year and three-year income. For the purposes of comparison, results 
are also shown for one-year income. The gap between these lines reflects the degree of 
mobility in each society – the extent to which averaging income over multiple years 
reduces the gini coefficient. The trends in biennial and triennial inequality are similar to 
those for annual inequality – rising in Germany and the United States, and flat for Britain. 
It is notable, however, that in the case of Germany, government policies muted somewhat 
the effects of the market, with biennial and triennial pre-government inequality rising 
much more sharply than equivalent measures for post-government inequality.  























































1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
United States
Dotted line denotes annual inequality. Dashed line denotes two-year inequality.
Solid line (circle for Australia) denotes three-year inequality.
Figure 2: Two-Year and Three-Year Income Inequality

























































1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
United States
Dotted line denotes annual inequality. Dashed line denotes two-year inequality.
Solid line (circle for Australia) denotes three-year inequality.
Figure 3: Two-Year and Three-Year Income Inequality
(Gini Coefficient for Post-Government Income)
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Figures 4 and 5 repeat this exercise, but now for five-year income and ten-year income 
(plotted alongside annual inequality, for comparison purposes). Again, the trends are 
qualitatively similar to those for biennial and triennial inequality, with permanent pre-
government income inequality rising in Germany and the United States and flat in 
Britain, and permanent post-government inequality rising only in the United States, but 
flat in Britain and Germany. Because the Australian dataset only covers three years, we 













































1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
United States
Dotted line denotes annual inequality. Dashed line denotes five-year inequality.
Solid line denotes ten-year inequality.
Figure 4: Five-Year and Ten-Year Income Inequality
(Gini Coefficient for Pre-Government Income)









































1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
United States
Dotted line denotes annual inequality. Dashed line denotes five-year inequality.
Solid line denotes ten-year inequality.
Figure 5: Five-Year and Ten-Year Income Inequality
(Gini Coefficient for Post-Government Income)
 
 
How does the level of inequality compare across these countries? To see this, I compare 
pre-government inequality and post-government inequality around 1990 (excluding 
Australia) and in the most recent year. Figure 6 shows these measures for annual income 
inequality. In 1990, the pre-government annual income inequality ordering (from most to 
least unequal) was the US, Britain and Germany. After taxes and transfers, this ordering 
remained unchanged. 
 
In the most recent year, annual pre-government inequality was almost precisely the same 
in Australia, Germany and the United States, with Britain having a slightly more equal 
distribution of market income. Government policies then produced a much more clear 
inequality ordering (from most to least equal): US, Australia, Britain, Germany. 
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Post-Government
Most recent year




Figure 7 repeats this comparison for triennial inequality. Around 1990, the ordering is the 
same as for annual income inequality. In terms of pre-government or post-government 
income, the ordering from most to least equal was the US, Britain, Germany. In the most 
recent year, the ordering in terms of three-year market income was: Germany, the US, 




                                                 
3 Similarly, for five-year post-government income or ten-year post-government income, the ranking is US, 














































Australia Britain Germany US
Post-Government
Most recent year
Figure 7: Comparing Three-Year Inequality
(Gini Coefficient)  14
Implicit in any comparison of annual income inequality and permanent income inequality 
is the degree of year-to-year income mobility. While some sense of the degree of income 
mobility in a country may be gleaned from a comparison of the difference between 
annual inequality and measures of inequality estimated over a longer timeframe, a more 
precise approach is to directly estimate mobility. For this purpose, a range of mobility 
indicators have been developed (see Jenkins 1991; Massoumi 1998; Benabou and Ok 
2001; Fields 2002; Van Kerm 2004).  
 
Here, I use the Shorrocks ratio (Shorrocks 1978), which is the ratio of average annual 
inequality over T years to permanent income inequality estimated from individual income 
summed over those T years. The Shorrocks ratio can vary between 1 (an immobile 
society, in which annual income inequality equals permanent income inequality) and 
epsilon (a perfectly mobile society, in which permanent income inequality approaches 
zero). Where mt is the average population income in year t, Mt+n is the average population 
income over all years t to t+n, Gt is the gini coefficient in year t, and Gt+n is the gini 
coefficient based on each individual’s permanent income over the years from t to t+n, the 


















Note that since higher levels of the Shorrocks ratio denote less mobility, it is effectively 
an index of immobility. Figures 8 and 9 depict the Shorrocks ratio for the four countries. 
In terms of pre-government income, Britain is flat over this period, while Germany 
became somewhat less mobile in the late-1980s, and the United States became slightly 



















































1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
United States
Dashed line denotes two-year mobility.
Solid line (circle for Australia) denotes three-year mobility.
Higher number denotes less mobility
Figure 8: Two-Year and Three-Year Income Immobility
(Shorrocks Ratio Based on Pre-Government Income)
 
 
Figure 9 focuses on income immobility, based upon post-government income. For 
Germany, post-government income mobility is constant across the period in question, 
while for Britain and the US, income mobility increased somewhat. For Australia, the 
panel is too short to measure changes in mobility. 











































1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
United States
Dashed line denotes two-year mobility.
Solid line (circle for Australia) denotes three-year mobility.
Higher number denotes less mobility
Figure 9: Two-Year and Three-Year Income Immobility
(Shorrocks Ratio Based on Post-Government Income)
 
 
Lastly, Figure 10 compares mobility across the four countries. Around 1990, the US was 
more immobile than either Britain or Germany (this is consistent with Burkhauser and 
Poupore 1997 who find that over the period 1983-88, the US was less mobile than 
Germany, and is also broadly consistent with the Britain-Germany-US comparison in 
Jarvis and Jenkins 1998). During the 1990s, Germany became somewhat less mobile, and 
the US somewhat more mobile.  
 
So far as I am aware, this is the first time that mobility rates in Australia have been 
compared with those in other countries. It appears that on either measure of income, 
Australia is significantly more mobile than Britain, Germany or the US. In terms of post-
government income, the mobility ranking of the countries is (from least to most mobile): 
Germany, Britain, the US, Australia. The shift from one-year post-government income to 
three-year post-government income reduces the German gini coefficient by only 7 
percent; by contrast, the Australian gini coefficient falls by 18 percent. 
 



















































Australia Britain Germany US
Post-Government
Most recent year
Figure 10: Comparing Three-Year Income Immobility





This paper uses panel data from four developed nations to estimate permanent income 
inequality, measured by averaging equivalized household income across multiple years. 
In general, I find that permanent income inequality has followed similar trends to annual 
income inequality, rising particularly sharply in the United States over the 1980s and 
1990s. Comparing levels of permanent income inequality across countries, the ranking of 
triennial pre-government inequality is Germany, the US, Britain, Australia. However, a 
more progressive systems of taxes and transfers in Britain and Germany changes these 
rankings substantially. In terms of triennial post-government inequality, the ranking is the 
US, Australia, Germany, Britain. 
 
Additionally, I calculate mobility rates across countries, and find some evidence that 
mobility rates rose during the 1990s in both Britain and the US. Ranking the four 
countries in terms of mobility, and taking the effects of government policies into account,   18
I find that in the most recent year, the most mobile of the four countries is Australia, 
while the least mobile is Germany.  
 
Contrary to popular belief, however, differences in mobility rates have little impact on 
countries’ inequality rankings.
4 In terms of post-government income, the inequality 
ranking using annual inequality measures is the US, Australia, Britain, Germany. Using 
three-year average incomes, the ranking becomes the US, Australia, Germany, Britain. 
Those countries that are most unequal in terms of standard measures of inequality are 
also the most unequal in terms of permanent income inequality.  
                                                 
4 For example, The Economist in 2003 presented data showing that inequality in the US had risen, but then 
caveated this with the statement: “America is a remarkably mobile society”.   19
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Data Appendix 
 
For the three countries in the CNEF (Britain, Germany and the US), variable names 
follow the same convention, with I11101YY denoting household pre-government income 
and I11102YY denoting household post-government income. In each case, YY represents 
the two-digit year. For example, I1110195 is household pre-government income in 1995. 
 
For the US, the PSID stopped estimating household taxes in survey year 1992 (income 
year 1991) so the value of post-government income is set equal to missing for subsequent 
years. I therefore follow the advice of the CNEF manual, and use I11113YY in place of 
I11102YY for the US in all years. 
 
In the CNEF files, the number of household members is given by the variable 
D11106YY. In all cases, incomes are equivalized by dividing by the square root of the 
number of household members. 
 
All figures are weighted using cross-sectional weights (W11101YY). Although the 
CNEF files also contain longitudinal weights (W11103YY), this variable is not used, 





Since Australia is not yet part of the CNEF, I used the HILDA variable names that 
appeared to be most comparable with the CNEF. HILDA variable names commence with 
a letter to denote the year of the survey, with the prefixes a, b and c denoting 2001, 2002 
and 2003 respectively. For example, atifprip is the variable for individual financial year 
private income (positive values) in 2001. In what appears below, this prefix letter is 
denoted by an underscore. 
 
_tifprip=individual financial year private income, positive values  
_tifprin=individual financial year private income, negative values 
_tifdip=individual financial year disposable income, positive values  
_tifdin= individual financial year disposable income, negative values 
 
Pre-government income = (_tifprip-_tifprin) summed within each household (_hhrhid), 
and divided by the square root of the number of household members (_hhpers).  
 
Post-government income = (_tifdip-_tifdin) summed within each household (_hhrhid), 
and divided by the square root of the number of household members (_hhpers).  
 
In all cases, I use cross-sectional weights (_hhwte) for the same reason as with the CNEF. 
 
For consistency with the CNEF files, imputed values are recoded as missing. 
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Britain (BHPS)  
 
Household pre-government income: This variable represents the combined income 
before taxes and government transfers of the head, partner, and other family members. 
This variable is constructed by the BHPS staff. It sums labor and nonlabor incomes of all 
household members. Missing values are imputed. See the BHPS codebooks at www.data-
archive.ac.uk for further details. This variable is in current year British pounds. 
 
Household post-government income: This variable represents the combined income 
after taxes and government transfers of the head, partner, and other family members. 
Household post-government income equals the sum of household pre-government 
income, household social security income, household annual public transfer income 
minus net household annual taxes. Household pre-government income consists of 
household annual gross labour income, household annual asset income, household private 
transfer income, household private retirement income. The above household income 
measures were constructed by Elena Bardasi, Stephen P. Jenkins, and John A. Rigg of the 
Institute for Social and Economic Research at the University of Essex. See Bardasi et al. 
(1999) in the DOC folder for details on the construction of this variable. This variable is 




The codebook defines the two variables as follows. 
 
Household post-government income: This variable represents the combined income 
before taxes and government transfers of all individuals in the household 16 years of age 
and older. This variable is the sum of total family income from labor earnings, asset 
flows, private retirement income and private transfers. Labor earnings include wages and 
salary from all employment including training, self-employment income, and bonuses, 
overtime, and profit-sharing. Asset flows include income from interest, dividends, and 
rent. Private transfers include payments from individuals outside of the household. 
Though not reported, this income most likely includes alimony and child support 
payments. This variable is in current year Euros. 
 
Household post-government income: This variable represents the combined income 
after taxes and government transfers all individuals in the household 16 years of age and 
older. This variable is the sum of total family income from labor earnings, asset flows, 
private retirement income, private transfers, public transfers, and social security pensions 
minus total family taxes. Labor earnings include wages and salary from all employment 
including training, self-employment income, bonuses, overtime, and profit-sharing. Asset 
flows include income from interest, dividends, and rent. Private transfers include 
payments from individuals outside of the household. Though not reported, this income 
most likely includes alimony and child support payments. Public transfers include 
housing allowances, child benefits, subsistence assistance from the Social Welfare 
Authority, special circumstances benefits from the Social Welfare Authority, government 
student assistance, maternity benefits, unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance,   24
and unemployment subsistence allowance. Social security pensions include payments 
from old age, disability, and widowhood pension schemes. The tax burdens provided here 
are based upon updated and modified tax calculation routines developed by Schwarze. 
The tax burden includes income taxes and payroll taxes (health, unemployment, and 
retirement insurance taxes). These routines are described in Schwarze (1995). Household 
post-government income has no negative values. This variable is in current year Euros. 
 
United States (PSID) 
 
Household pre-government income: This variable represents the combined income 
before taxes and government transfers of the head, partner, and other family members. 
This variable is the sum of total family income from labor earnings, asset flows, private 
transfers, and private pensions. Labor earnings include wages and salary from all 
employment including self-employment (farming, business, market gardening, and 
roomers and boarders), professional practice or trade, bonuses, overtime and 
commissions. Asset flows include income from interest, dividends, and rent. 
Private transfers include child support, alimony, and income from non-household 
members. Private pensions include retirement income from private pension plans, 
Veterans Administration pensions, and annuities. Household pre-government income can 
have negative values. This variable is in current year dollars. 
 
Household post-government income: This variable represents the combined income 
after taxes (TAXSIM) and government transfers of the head, partner, and other family 
members. This variable is the sum of total family income from labor earnings, asset 
flows, the imputed rental value of owner occupied housing, private transfers, public 
transfers, and social security pensions minus total household taxes. Except for the 
household tax component, this variable is identical to I11102YY. Federal and state 
income taxes are estimated using the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
TAXSIM Model with currently available PSID variables. Taxes are estimated for each 
tax unit within the household and then summed over all tax units within the household to 
arrive at a total household tax burden. Payroll taxes of the head and partner are added 
together with the federal and state income taxes to arrive at a total household burden. 
Payroll taxes are calculated by bracketing labor income and applying the average payroll 
tax rate for that bracket as reported by the Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical 
Supplement, 1998, p. 37. The method for estimating PSID tax burdens is described in 
Butrica and Burkhauser (1997). The NBER TAXSIM Model is described in Feenberg 
and Coutts (1995). No algorithms are provided for the tax estimates. Household post-
government income can have negative values. This variable is in current year dollars. 
 